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Abstract. In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange
economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active
Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.
1 Introduction
In this paper we present an unifying framework for the study of market games in
exchange economies. In classical exchange economies when all goods are divisible
particular market games have been considered by Shubik (1977) and Schmeidler
(1980). A general axiomatic framework was introduced by Benassy (1986). He
proposed a set of axioms that defines a market game, and he was able to show that
1) the Walrasian allocation can be supported as a Nash Equilibrium (NE in the
sequel), and 2) that when all markets are active, all NE yield Walrasian allocations.
It was shown in specific models by Dubey (1982) (assuming divisible goods) and
Svensson (1991) (assuming one indivisible good) that the set of Strong Equilibrium
(SE) outcomes coincideswith the set ofNEoutcomeswhen all themarkets are active
and with the set of Walrasian allocations (other models of indivisibilities include
those of Roth 1982; Kaneko 1983; Gale 1984; Quinzii 1984; Svensson 1984, 1988;
Demange and Gale 1985; Maskin 1987; Roth and Sotomayor 1988; Tadenuma and
Thomson 1990).
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A natural question is whether the results explained above depend on either the
special structure of the commodity space or on the particular game form used. In
this paper we address this question and show that neither is the case. We present
a model in which the commodity space has no special structure (and thus it could
have both many divisible and many indivisible goods), and we propose a set of
axioms that a market game should satisfy. With these axioms in hand we prove that
the set of Walrasian allocations, SE outcomes and NE outcomes when all markets
are active coincide.
The main insight of this paper is that from the point of view of implementation
in NE and SE, convexity does not matter very much. Other insights gained by the
study of market games are the following: 1) To sustain Walrasian allocations as NE
or SE equilibria outcomes requires relatively harmless and simple assumptions.
2) However, to eliminate non-Walrasian equilibria requires strong assumptions
on the mechanism (i.e., some kind of Bertrand competition which implies that
the outcome function is discontinuous, see Benassy 1986, pp. 99–100) and the
assumption that allmarkets are active. 3) Individual feasibility cannot be guaranteed
outside equilibrium.1 And 4) as long as all markets are active, the fact that coalitions
can or can not be formed does notmatter since implementation occurs inNE and SE.
Given that Implementation by means of market games has intuitive appeal because
the underlying mechanism is both natural and simple, it would be nice to know if
our results can be extended to production economies and other social choice rules.
Our work can be regarded as an application of implementation theory to a
specific problem. The authors hope that it might modestly contribute to show that
implementation is not only about abstruse mechanisms but can also shed some light
on the functioning of real life institutions like double auction markets. It should be
remarked though that market games mimic but are not markets (in the same way
than an artificial heart mimics but is not a heart). In particular some tendencies that
are spontaneous in a market are reflected here in the form of the outcome function.
For instance, in a frictionless market arbitrage implies that there is only one trading
price for each good. In the class of market games considered here, the existence of
an unique trading price is assumed directly.
The rest of the paper goes as follows. In the next section we present our model
of a market game. Section 3 gathers our main results. Finally, Sect. 4 offers some
comments.
2 The model
This section has five parts. a) The description of the environment, b) the definition
of a social choice correspondence, c) the description of a game form (also called a
mechanism), d) the definition of the game-theoretical equilibrium concepts and e)
the notion of implementation.
1 For the issue of Individual Feasibility see our comments after Theorem 1. See also Postlewaite and
Wettstein (1989).
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2.1 Environment
There are h consumers and n + 1 goods, where n and h are natural numbers.
We denote by H the set of consumers. Goods 1, . . . , n are (possibly indivisible)
goods, the set of these goods is denoted by G. Good 0 is a perfectly divisible good
which can be loosely termed as money. A net trade for consumer i is an n + 1
dimensional vector (xi1, . . . , xin,mi), sometimes also represented by (xi,mi),
where xig (resp. mi) is her net trade of commodity g ∈ G (resp. money). The set
of individually feasible net trades for consumer i is denoted by Xi = Ci × Mi
where xi ∈ Ci and mi ∈ Mi = R. We do not impose any structure on Ci
except that Ci is a subset or Rn. The preferences of i over net trades in Xi are
represented by a utility function ui : Xi → R denoted by ui = ui(xi,mi) which
is assumed to be strictly increasing in money. We will also assume that any bundle
inside Xi is preferred to any bundle outside Xi 2 and that ui is never decreasing
in any of its arguments, i.e., goods can be freely disposable by consumers. Let
us denote by (x,m) ∈ R(n+1)h the h-tuple of net trades for consumers 1, . . . , h
also referred to as an allocation. An allocation (x,m) is said to be balanced if
∀g ∈ G,∑i∈H xig ≤ 0 and∑i∈H mi ≤ 0. We remark that a balanced allocation
does not need to be totally feasible because agents may receive net trades which
are not individually feasible. The set of balanced allocations is denoted by F. We
will assume that the number of agents and the individually feasible net trade sets
are fixed. Thus an economy, denoted either by e or by (ui)i∈H , is a list of utility
functions, one for each agent. Let us denote by E the set of admissible economies.
2.2 Social choice correspondence
A social choice correspondenceΦ : E → F associates a non-empty set of balanced
allocations to every e ∈ E . It is meant to represent the objectives of the society. In
this paper Φwill be the Walrasian correspondence. In order to define this let us first
define a Walrasian Equilibrium (WE in the sequel) for a particular economy e ∈ E .
Definition 1. A Walrasian Equilibrium for an economy (ui)i∈H is a balanced
allocation (xw,mw) and a vector of prices pw ∈ Rn+ such that ∀i ∈ H
(xwi ,m
w
i ) maximizes ui(xi,mi) subject to p
wxi + mi = 0, .
Notice that in the above definitionmoney is the numeraire. TheWalrasian social
choice correspondence maps the set of economies in allocations that are Walrasian
equilibria for these economies. In what follows we assume that the domain E is
such that the Walrasian social choice correspondence is well defined.
2 This assumption is needed to evaluate bundles outside consumption sets, see Subsect. 2.3 below.
A similar assumption is made by Hurwicz (1979 b), Schmeidler (1980) and Benassy (1986).
3
2.3 Game forms and market games
AGameForm (or amechanism) is a list (Si, f), i ∈ H ,whereSi denotes the strategy
set of consumer i and f is the outcome function. In a market game a strategy for
consumer (player) i is a 2n dimensional vector of real numbers si = (πi, qi) where
πi = (πi1, . . . , πin) (resp. qi = (qi1, ..., qin)) represents the vector of bids (resp.
net trades) proposed by player i. Let us denote by π (resp. by q) the list of bids
(resp. net trades) proposed by all players and by s ≡ (π, q) ∈ R2nh the list of
all strategies for all players. Let S ≡ ∏i∈H Si. The outcome function f maps S
into the set of balanced allocations, i.e., f : S → F . This implies that we do not
require allocations to be individually feasible: Bundles outside the consumption set
are evaluated according with the extension of preferences made in part a) above.3
Let fi be the ith component of f . It represents the allocation of goods and money
obtained by i i.e., fi(s) ≡ (xi(s),mi(s)). Let p be the n-dimensional vector of
trading prices as a function of s, i.e., p : S → Rn+ or p = p(s).4 The
vector p is such that
∑
i∈H xig < 0 implies pg = 0. The budget constraint for
consumer i is Bi(p) = {(xi,mi) ∈ Xi | pxi + mi ≤ 0}. The outcome function f
selects allocations satisfying the budget constraint of each consumer with equality,
and thus the quantity of money allocated to consumer i, denoted by mi(s), is
mi(s) = −p(s)xi(s), where xi(s) is the net trade of goods allocated to i if the
strategy s is played.
2.4 Equilibrium
Let vi(s) ≡ ui(fi(s)) be the indirect utility function associated to the list of strate-
gies s ∈ S. Also let us denote by s−i the list of strategies played by all consumers
except i. Then we have the following definition:
Definition 2. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a game form (S, f) for an economy
(ui)i∈H is a list of strategies sn ∈ S such that ∀ i ∈ H,
vi(sn) ≥ vi(si, sn−i)∀ si ∈ Si.
A coalition, denoted by C, is a non empty subset of the set of all players. A list
of strategies for all members of C is denoted by sc and the corresponding strategy
set by Sc. Similarly s−c denotes the list of strategies for all players not in C.
Definition 3. A Strong Equilibrium (SE) of a game form (S, f) for an economy
(ui)i∈H is a list of strategies ss ∈ S such that there is no coalition C, and
sc ∈ Sc such that vi(sc, ss−c) ≥ vi(ss),∀i ∈ C and vj(sc, ss−c) > vj(ss) for
some j ∈ C.5
3 The extension of our results to a mechanism where allocations are always individually feasible is
discussed after Theorem 1 below.
4 Benassy does not assume directly, aswe do, that all traders buy at the same price. This possibility can
be considered in our model at the cost of some complications. However, under Benassy´s assumptions,
at any NE their trading prices are identical.
5 An alternative definition of strong equilibrium requires that the inequality be strict for all members
of C. In our model both notions coincide.
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2.5 Implementation
LetNE(S, f , e) be the set of Nash Equilibrium strategies for the mechanism (S, f)
and the economy e. Let SE(S, f , e) be the set of Strong Equilibrium strategies for
the mechanism (S, f) and the economy e. Then, we come to the main definitions
of the paper.
Definition 4. The Game form (S, f) implements a social choice correspondence
Φ in the domain E in Nash Equilibrium if ∀e ∈ E
Φ(e) = f(NE(S, f, e)).
Definition 5. The Game form (S, f) implements a social choice correspondence
Φ in the domain E in Strong Equilibrium if ∀e ∈ E
Φ(e) = f(SE(S, f, e)).
Definitions 4 and 5 refer to the equilibrium concepts that we will use in the
remainder of the paper. The notion ofNE is relevant in a non cooperative framework,
where agents can not engage in binding agreements. The notion of a SE is meant
to capture the outcome of a game in which cooperation or at least some kind of
coordination is feasible. If the designer does not have a priori information about
the feasibility of those agreements, it appears to be desirable for implementation
to occur in both scenarios. This is the concept of double implementation, a term
coined by Eric Maskin, which we present formally in the next definition.
Definition 6. The Game form (S, f) doubly implements in Nash and Strong equi-
librium a social choice correspondence Φ in the domain E if ∀e ∈ E ,
Φ(e) = f(SE(S, f,e)) = f(NE(S, f, e)).
3 Results
In this section we gather together our main findings on market games. Let us now
present our two first axioms:
Unanimity (U). If s ≡ (π, q) ∈ S is such that πi = πj ,∀i, j ∈ H , then
p(s) = πi. If in addition q is such that for all g ∈ G
∑
i qig = 0 then x(s) = q.
Voluntary Trade (VT). ∀g ∈ G, ∀i ∈ H,∀s ∈ S,
xig(s) > 0 implies that pg(s) ≤ πig and xig(s) < 0 implies that pg(s) ≥ πig.
Unanimity says that if all bids are the same, trading pricesmust be equal to these
bids, and, if in addition the proposed net trade vector is balanced, net trades allocated
by the mechanism must be equal to the net trades asked for by consumers. This
is a weak property which must be satisfied by any satisfactory model of resource
allocation in market economies. The Voluntary Trade axiom says that in order to
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get a positive (resp. negative) net trade of, say, commodity g, the trading price of
g must be greater than or equal (resp. lower or equal) to the bid of any seller (resp.
buyer). Under theVT axiom the interpretation of bids is that if consumer i is a net
demander (resp. supplier) of good g, πig is the maximum (resp. minimum) price at
which she is prepared to accept a net trade of qig units of good g. Special cases of
this property have been proposed by Benassy (1986, p. 100), Svensson (1991) and
Silvestre (1985). Now, we are ready to prove our first result.
Proposition 1. Let (S, f) be a market game form in which VT and U hold. Then,
if (pw, xw,mw) is a WE, ∃s such that s is a SE and f(s) = (xw,mw).
Proof. Let us first construct s. For a typical consumer i, let πi = pw and qi = xwi .
Then, by U, f(s) = (xw,mw) and pw = p(s). Therefore if the Proposition were
not true there is a coalitionC, and a s′c ∈ Sc such that vi(s′c, s−c) ≥ vi(s), ∀i ∈ C
and vj(s′c, s−c) > vj(s) for some j ∈ C. Let (x′i, m′i) = fi(s′c, s−c),∀i ∈ C. Let
also p′ be the new vector of trading prices, i.e., p′ = p(s′c, s−c). Then by revealed
preference we have pwx′i +m′i ≥ pwxwi +mw = 0 ∀i ∈ C and ∃j ∈ C for whom
the inequality is strict.
Since p′x′i + m′i ≤ 0, it follows from that and the previous inequality that x′i
(p′ − pw) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ C and ∃j ∈ C for whom the inequality is strict. Adding over
i we get:
(p′ − pw) ·
∑
i∈C
x′i < 0 (1)
Since the Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto Efficient, C can not be composed of
all agents. Also, if the sum of net demands of the members of C of a good is
negative (i.e., C is a net supplier of, say commodity g) we have two cases. If the
complementary coalition is a net demander of g, by V T it must be that p′g ≤ πrg =
pwg for some r /∈ C, since all sellers outside the coalition are bidding pw. If the
complementary coalition is not a net demander of g, p′g = 0. In any case, the
corresponding term in (1) above is positive or zero. If the sum of net demands of
the members of C of a good g is positive, the complementary coalition is a net
supplier of g, by V T it must be that p′g ≥ πrg = pwg for some r /∈ C, since all
agents outside the coalition are bidding pw. Then, the corresponding term in (1) is
positive or zero. Finally, if for some good
∑
i∈C x
′
ig = 0, the corresponding term
is zero. This shows that the inequality (1) above is impossible. unionsq
The logic behind Proposition 1 is the following: Suppose that market prices
and the allocation are Walrasian and a group of agents, say all the oil producing
countries, collude and attempt to raise the price of oil. Since importing countries
make no change in their bidding strategies,VT implies that oil producing countries
cannot sell a single drop of oil and thus they can not improve welfare by colluding.
Since a SE is a NE, we have that:
Corollary 1. Let (S, f) a game form in which VT and U hold. Then, if (pw, xw,
mw) is a WE, ∃s such that s is a NE and f(s) = (xw,mw).
In order to obtain a converse to Proposition 1 we need some extra conditions.
First we impose two additional axioms on the class of mechanisms. Second, we
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assume that for each i, ui() is continuous on money, and that for each p, there
exists a utility maximizing choice in Bi(p). Finally, the converse to Proposition 1
applies only to active NE: A NE, sn, is active if for each g, there is an agent j with
xjg(sn) > 0.
Reactiveness (R). Let s be a strategy profile such that in market g, πig > πjg with
xig(s) > 0 and xjg(s) < 0. Then ∃s′, identical to s except in component r (with
r = i or r = j) such that ∀k 
= g:
xr(s′) = xr(s), (pg(s′) − pg(s))xrg(s) < 0 and pk(s) = pk(s′)
This axiom means that, when the bid made by a buyer is greater than the bid
made by a seller, there is a way for (at least) one of them to modify the price (to
increase the price if he is a seller, or to decrease the price if he is a buyer) without
affecting either her consumption bundle or the other prices. Recall that we are
interpreting π′s as maximum buying (resp. minimum selling) bids. Thus, Axiom
R says that any discrepancy between those bids can be eliminated by our market
game with a minimal impact on allocations and other prices. In other words, the
mechanism mimics what in this circumstances is a natural reaction of maximizing
agents, namely to push the market price downwards (buyers) or upwards (sellers).
We remark that this axiom does not imply that the general equilibrium effects of a
change in the price of good g, pg , vanish. What it means is that when two agents
want to change pg , the market games give room to, at least, one of them to do
so, leaving other prices unaffected. Thus, this axiom is automatically satisfied in
general equilibrium models of price-making agents. We will now postulate the
following:
Strong Bertrand Competition (SBC). Let s−i be a strategy profile where all
active traders minus i quote the same bid p. Given x′i, if x′i 
= 0, let I = {g ∈ G |
x′ig > 0} and D = {g ∈ G | x′ig < 0 }. Then for all π′i such that π′ig > pg
∀g ∈ I and π′ig < pg ∀g ∈ D, ∃qi such that: x′i = xi(π′i, qi, s−i), and mi(π′i,
qi, s−i) = −p(π′i, qi, s−i)x′i. If x′i = 0, then there exist s′i = (π′i, q′i) with π′i = p
such that x′i = xi(s′i, s−i), and mi(s′i, s−i) = 0 .
The SBC Axiom says that a seller (resp. a buyer) by cutting (resp. increasing)
the market price can transact as much as she wants. Furthermore, by agreeing in
the price announcement of all the other agents he always has the possibility of no
trade. This implies that in any active NE in which agents quote the same price, the
outcome is individually rational. The adjective “strong” refers to the fact that in
textbook Bertrand competition, by undercutting market price a firm can get all the
demand at this new price. In our case, by undercutting others, an agent can get as
much as she wants. Now we have the following result:
Proposition 2. In any market game form in which VT,R and SBC hold any
active NE yields a Walrasian allocation.
Proof. We will first prove that for any pair of active traders i and j in a market,
say g, we have that in any NE πig = πjg . Because V T if the market is active and,
say xig(s) > 0 (resp. <), it must be that pg(s) ≤ (resp. ≥) πig . Suppose that there
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exists a pair of active traders i and j such that πig > πjg where i (resp. j) is the
net buyer (resp. seller). Suppose that in Axiom R, r = i. Then, ∃s′i such that
xi(s′) = xi(s), pg(s′) < pg(s) and pk(s) = pk(s′),∀k 
= g
But then, i is clearly better off by playing s′i because preferences are monotonic
on money. This contradicts that we are at a NE. The same argument holds if r =
j. Therefore, in an active market, any pair of a supplier and a demander announce
the same price. Let π∗g the common price announcement in market g. Let π∗ =
(π∗g)g∈G. By VT, buyer i′s price announcement πig and seller j′s announcement
πjg should satisfy πjg ≤ pg(s) ≤ πig. Since πig = πjg = π∗g , pg(s) = π∗g .
Therefore, p(s) = π∗.
Let (xi,mi) be the bundle obtained by i in a NE and (x′i, m′i) be a most
preferred bundle for i in Bi(p(s)) (this bundle exists by assumption). Obviously
ui(x′i, m
′
i) ≥ ui(xi,mi). If ui(x′i, m′i) = ui(xi,mi) ∀i ∈ H , the NE yields a
Walrasian allocation. Let us assume that there is a trader, say i, for whom ui(x′i,
m′i) > ui(xi,mi). By SBC, we know that the outcome of an active NE in which
agents quote the same price is individually rational. Thus, x′i 
= 0. Let I = {g ∈
G/x′ig > 0} andD = {g ∈ G/x′ig < 0}. Let π′ig = pg(s)+ for all g ∈ I , and
π′ig = pg(s)−  for all g ∈ D. By SBC there is qi such that x′i = xi(π′i, qi, s−i),
and mi(π′i, qi, s−i) = − p(π′i, qi, s−i)x′i. By V T, pg(π′i, qi, s−i) ≤ π′ig =
pg(s)+ for all g ∈ I, and pg(s)− = π′ig ≤ pg(π′i, qi, s−i) for all g ∈ D. Since
the outcome function selects balanced allocations, for each g ∈ I there is an agent
j 
= i which is a net supplier of good g. That is, xjg(π′i, qi, s−i) < 0, and then, by
V T, pg(s) = πjg ≤ pg(π′i, qi, s−i). If g ∈ D, there is an agent k 
= i which is a
net demander of good g. That is, xjg(π′i, qi, s−i) > 0, and then, by V T, pg(π′i,
qi, s−i) ≤ πjg = pg(s). Then, summarizing we get that:
pg(s) ≤ pg(π′i, qi, s−i) ≤ pg(s) +  for all g ∈ I
pg(s) −  ≤ pg(π′i, qi, s−i) ≤ pg(s)for all g ∈ D
Therefore
m′i ≥ mi(π′i, qi, s−i) ≥ m′i −
∑
g∈I
x′ig +
∑
g∈D
x′ig.
Because preferences are continuous on money, for a sufficiently small ,
ui(x′i,m
′
i) > ui(x
′
i,mi(π
′
i, qi, s−i)) > ui(xi,mi)
which is a contradiction. Thus, any active NE yields Walrasian allocations. unionsq
Corollary 2. Under the conditions of Proposition 2, any Strong Equilibrium where
all markets are active yields Walrasian allocations.
Theorem 1. Any market game satisfyingU,VT,R, and SBC doubly implements
the Walrasian correspondence in Nash and Strong equilibrium if all markets are
active.
Axiom SBC implies that for some strategy profiles, the resulting allocation
is not individually feasible. Individual feasibility can be restored by redefining
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SBC in such a way that the deviating agent can get any allocation compatible with
individual feasibility and balancedness. In this case, the conclusion of Proposition
2 would refer to Constrained Walrasian Equilibria, defined as a feasible allocation
and a vector of prices such that each agent maximizes utility subject to the budget
constraint and to the feasibility constraint (i.e., no agent can demand more than the
aggregate endowment).6
To close this section we describe two examples fulfilling all our axioms. The
basic difference between the two examples is how people are matched when they
submit different bids. In the first example, we match all the agents bidding above
themarket price with the agents bidding belowmarket price. These agents can trade
among them whenever there is no one bidding exactly the market price. Otherwise,
they get zero. In the second example, different groups are formed depending on
how big the bids are. In this case, trade is organized in a way that the group with
the smallest bid above market price trade with the group with the biggest bid below
market price and we continue matching different groups in this way. Finally we
notice (see Sect. 4) that a modification of the market game proposed by Svensson
(1991) in economies with indivisible goods also satisfies our axioms.
Example 1. Consider the class of market games, (Si, f), i ∈ H,with the following
properties: Given the strategy s = (π, q), for each good g ∈ G, the price function
pg(s) is such that: (1) For each market g, the final price only depends on the bids
of the agents for that market, that is, pg(s) = pg(πg). (2) The function pg(s) is
continuous. (3) The function pg(s) is strictly monotone in πig. (4) For all g ∈ G,
mini∈H{πig} ≤ pg(s) ≤ maxi∈H{πig}. To define the allocation of goods, we
distinguish among the subsets of agents Ng, Ig, and Dg defined as follows:
Ng = {i ∈ H | πig = pg(s)}
Ig = {i ∈ H | πig < pg(s)}
Dg = {i ∈ H | πig > pg(s)}
Net trades of good g allocated to each of the agents in those sets only depend on
qg and are described as follows:
(I) If Ng 
= ∅, for all i /∈ Ng, xig(s) = 0, and for all i ∈ Ng, xig(s) should be
such that
∑
i∈Ng xig(s) = 0, and xig(s) = qig whenever
∑
i∈Ng qig = 0. Some
examples are:
(a) For all i ∈ Ng, if
(∑
j∈Ng qjg
)
qig ≤ 0, then xig(s) = qig, and for the rest of
agents in Ng that does not satisfy this (let S ⊆ Ng be such a set),
xig(s) = qig −
∑
j∈Ng qjg
|S| .
(b) For all i ∈ Ng, if
(∑
j∈Ng qjg
)
qig ≤ 0, then xig(s) = qig, and for the rest of
agents in Ng that does not satisfy this (let S ⊆ Ng be such a set),
xig(s) =
−∑j∈Ng\S qjg∑
j∈S qjg
qig,
6 A formal proof of this statement is available under request.
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that is, among this agents we apply a proportional rule.
(c) If∑j∈Ng qjg ≥ 0, for all i ∈ Ng such that qig ≤ 0, xig(s) = qig, and for the
rest of agents,
xig(s) = min{λ, qig},with λ ∈ R+and s.t.
∑
i∈Ng
xig(s) = 0.
If
∑
j∈Ng qjg ≤ 0, for all i ∈ Ng such that qig ≥ 0, xig(s) = qig, and for the
rest of agents,
xig(s) = max{−λ, qi},with λ ∈ R+and is s.t.
∑
i∈Ng
xig(s) = 0.
(d) Satisfy the announced supplies, that is, for all i ∈ Ng such that qig ≤ 0,
xig(s) = qig (let M be the total supply in absolute terms) and then apply the
uniform rule on the demand, that is, if
∑
qig>0 qig ≥ M,
xig(s) = min{qig, λ},with λ ∈ R+ and s.t.
∑
qig>0
min{qig, λ} = M,
if
∑
qig>0 qig < M,
xig(s) = max{qig, λ}, with λ ∈ R+ and s.t.
∑
qig>0
max{qig, λ} = M.
(e) Satisfy the announced demands, that is, for all i ∈ Ng such that qig ≥ 0,
xig(s) = qig (let M be the total demand), and then apply the uniform rule on
the supply, that is, if
∑
qig≥0 |qig| ≥ M,
xig(s) = max{qig, λ} with λ ∈ R− and s.t.
∑
qig<0
max{qig, λ} = M,
if
∑
qig<0 |qig| < M,
xig(s) = min{qig, λ} with λ ∈ R− and s.t.
∑
qig<0
min{qig, λ} = M.
(f) For all i ∈ Ng,
xig(s) = qig −
∑
j∈Ng qjg
|Ng| .
(II) IfNg = ∅ and the set of agents is greater than two, we distinguish the following
cases:
(i) If Ig = {i} and |Dg| > 1, xig(s) = min{0, qi} and for all j ∈ Dg, apply any
allocation rule such that xjg(s) ≥ 0, and the total demand equals to −xig(s).
For example, among all the agents in Dg that announce qjg ≤ 0, xjg(s) = 0,
and for the rest of agents in this set, we can apply the uniform rule (like in (d))
or the proportional rule among others.
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(ii) If Dg = {i} and |Ig| > 1, xig(s) = max{0, qi} and for all j ∈ Ig,apply any
allocation rule such that xjg(s) ≤ 0, and the total supply equals to −xig(s).
For example, among all agents in Ig that announce qjg ≥ 0, xjg(s) = 0, and
for the rest of agents in this set, we can apply the uniform rule (like in (e)) or
the proportional rule among others.
(iii) In any other possible case, for all i ∈ Dg, xig(s) ≥ 0, and for all i ∈ Ig,
xig(s) ≤ 0 and
∑
xig(s) = 0. For example, xig(s) = 0 for all i ∈ Dg such
that qig < 0 and for all i ∈ Ig such that qig > 0, among the rest of agents we
can apply rules like in (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e).
(III) Finally, if we only have two agents, and they do not announce the same price,
given the properties on the price function, we will get that Ng = ∅, and Ig = {i},
Dg = {j}. In this situation, xig(s) ≤ 0, xig(s) = − xjg(s) and it should be such
that agent i can get any xig < 0 if he announces an appropriate qig given qjg. And,
symmetrically, agent j can get any xjg > 0 if he announces an appropriate qjg
given qig. For example,
xig(s) = min{0, qig − qig + qjg2 } and xjg(s) = max{0, qjg −
qig + qjg
2
}
Let’s show that this class of games satisfies all our axioms.
– Unanimity is trivially satisfied.
– If an agent i is a net demander of a good g (xig(s) > 0), then either i ∈ Ng or
Ng = ∅ and then i ∈ Dg, in any case, pg(s) ≤ πig. If agent j is a net supplier
of a good g (xjg(s) < 0), then either j ∈ Ng or Ng = ∅ and then j ∈ Ig, in
any case, pg(s) ≥ πjg. Therefore Voluntary Trade is satisfied.
– Let s be a strategy profile such that in market g, πig > πjg with xig(s) > 0 and
xjg(s) < 0. Then, clearly Ng = ∅, i ∈ Dg , and j ∈ Ig. Let s′ be identical to s
except in component i, where this agent announced the same qig than in si, and
π′ig = πig−ε.Sincepg(.)onlydependson thebids of the agents for themarketg,
it is continuous and strictly monotone in πig, pg(s′) < pg(s). Furthermore, we
can choose ε sufficiently small such that in the new situationN ′g = ∅, D′g = Dg
and I ′g = Ig. Thus, ∀k 
= g, xi(s′) = xi(s), (pg(s′) − pg(s))xig(s) < 0 and
pk(s) = pk(s′). Therefore Reactiveness is satisfied.
– Notice that Strong Bertrand competition is trivially satisfied in this class of
games. Under the hypothesis of the Axiom, if in a market g one agent deviates
from the bids announcements of the others, either we are in the situation de-
scribed in (i), in (ii) or in (III). In any case, the agent who deviates can transact
as much as he wants. Furthermore, if he wants to stay inactive, he can always
quote the same price as the others, and a q′i such that he gets cero. For example,
in (a),(b), (c),(d) and (e), announcing q′i = 0, he gets cero. In (f) he gets cero if
he announces q′ig = 1|Ng|−1
∑
j =i qjg for each g.
Example 2. Let (Si, f), i ∈ H, be a market game form described as follows:
Given the strategy s = (π, q), for each good g ∈ G, let pg(s) =
∑
i∈H πig
h .
7 Let
7 For simplicity we consider here a very simple example of a price function. However, it can be
shown that any price function satisfying properties (1) - (4) spelled out at the beginning of Example 1
yields the same result.
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Ng, Ig, and Dg be subsets of agents defined as follows:
Ng = {i ∈ H | πig = pg(s)}
Ig = {i ∈ H | πig < pg(s)}
Dg = {i ∈ H | πig > pg(s)}
Net trades of good g allocated to each of the agents in those sets are:
1. For all i ∈ Ng, xig(s) = qig −
∑
j∈Ng qjg
|Ng| . Thus, agents in Ng trade among
themselves.
2. Agents in Ig trade with agents in Dg. We start matching those agents in Ig
with bids closer to pg(s) with agents in Dg with bids also close to pg(s). These
agents trade among themselves, and we continue matching agents from these
two sets in this way. To formally describe this process, let’s define the following
subsets of agents.
I1g =
{
i ∈ Ig | qig = min
{
qjg | πjg = max
k∈Ig
πkg
}}
D1g =
{
i ∈ Dg | qig = max
{
qjg | πjg = min
k∈Dg
πkg
}}
................................
Ikg =
{
i ∈ Ig\ ∪k−1l=1 I lg | qig = min
{
qjg | πjg = max
k∈Ig\∪k−1l=1 Ilg
πkg
}}
Dkg =
{
i ∈ Dg\ ∪k−1l=1 Dlg | qig = max
{
qjg | πjg = min
k∈Dg\∪k−1l=1 Dlg
πkg
}}
Agents in Ikg will trade with agents in Dkg according to the following rule:
For all i ∈ Ikg , xig(s) = min{0, qig −
∑
j∈Ikg ∪Dkg
qjg
|Ikg ∪Dkg | }, and for all i ∈ D
k
g ,
xig(s) = max{0, qig −
∑
j∈Ikg ∪Dkg
qjg
|Ikg ∪Dkg | }. Notice that all agents in the same group
announce the samenet trade, therefore if for an agent j ∈ Ikg , xjg(s) = 0, then for all
i ∈ Ikg , xig(s) = 0 and for all agent i ∈ Dkg , xig(s) = 0 and vice versa. Therefore,
final net trades among these groups are balanced, that is,
∑
i∈Ikg ∪Dkg xig(s) = 0.
Notice also that if one of these sets is empty, there is no trade. That is, suppose that
for some k, Ikg = ∅, then for all i ∈ Dkg , xig(s) = 0.
Let’s show that this market game satisfies all our axioms.
– Unanimity is trivially satisfied.
– Notice that if xig(s) > 0, i ∈ Ng ∪ Dkg for some k, and then πig ≥ pg(s). If
xig(s) < 0, i ∈ Ng∪Ikg for some k, and then πig ≤ pg(s).Therefore Voluntary
Trade is satisfied.
– Suppose that s is a strategy profile such that in market g, πig > πjg with
xig(s) > 0 and xjg(s) < 0. Then πjg ≤ pg(s) < πig or πjg < pg(s) ≤ πig.
Let suppose first that πjg ≤ pg(s) < πig. In this case we have to show that
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there is a way for agent i to reduce the price of good g without affecting her
consumption bundle. In order to guarantee this, let s′ be a strategy identical to
s except in component ig. Let π′ig be such that the mean of the bids is an ε less
than π′ig. Thus, pg(s′) < π′ig, which implies that there is at least one agent j
such that πjg < pg(s′), and therefore, I1g 
= ∅. We can choose ε sufficiently
small such thatD1g = {i}. Then agent iwill trade, according to our mechanism,
with the agents in I1g . In order to obtain the same net trade than agent i gets
under the strategy s, let q′ig be such that xig(s) = q′ig −
q′ig+
∑
j∈I1g qjg
|I1g |+1 . Finally,
we have to show that pg(s′) < pg(s). For this, we only need to prove that
π′ig < πig. Since pg(s′) = π′ig − ε =
π′ig+
∑
j =i πjg
h , we have that (h− 1)π′ig =
hpg(s)−πig+hε.Since pg(s) < πig,we can always choose ε sufficiently small
such that π′ig < πig. Thus, given this s′, pg(s′) < pg(s) and xig(s′) = xig(s).
For the case where πjg < pg(s) ≤ πig, we can, in a similar way as above,
construct a strategy for agent j such that pg(s′) > pg(s) and xjg(s′) = xjg(s).
Therefore Reactiveness is satisfied.
– Let s−i be a strategy profile where all active agents minus i quote the same bid
p. Given x′i 
= 0, let I = {g ∈ G | x′ig > 0} and D = {g ∈ G | x′ig < 0}. For
each g ∈ I, and for all π′ig > pg, let q′ig be such that x′ig = q′ig−
q′ig+
∑
j∈I1g qjg
|I1g |+1 .
The net trade q′ig is well defined because pg < pg(s′) < πig and therefore
I1g 
= ∅. For each g ∈ D, and for all π′ig < pg, let q′ig be such that x′ig =
q′ig −
q′ig+
∑
j∈D1g qjg
|D1g|+1 . The net trade q
′
ig is well defined because D1g 
= ∅. Given
the strategy s = (s−i, s′i) with s′i = (π′, q′), for each g ∈ G, xig(s′) = x′ig. If
x′i = 0, then by announcing π′i = p, all agents are in Ng, and by announcing
q′i =
1
|Ng|−1
∑
j =i qjg for each g, he gets cero. Therefore Strong Bertrand
Competition is satisfied.
4 Relationship with the literature
We end the paper by discussing the relation of our results with those obtained by
Svensson (1991) and Benassy (1986).
In themarket game proposed bySvensson (1991) for economieswith indivisible
goods, all active and tight8 Nash equilibria are strong equilibria that yieldWalrasian
allocations, but there may be Nash equilibria that are not tight because reactiveness
is not satisfied. This is because in Svensson’s mechanism, every agent announces
a price vector, an object is assigned to the agent who announced the highest price,
and this is the price paid for the object. In case of a tie the only requirement is that
the object is not assigned to the owner. Suppose that the bid made by a buyer is
larger than the bid made by a seller, and there is a different agent who announces
the same bid as the buyer. In this situation the buyer (the seller) cannot decrease
(increase) the price without affecting his consumption. However, Svensson’s game
8 A Nash equilibrium is tight if the seller’s and the buyer’s bids are equal.
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can be easily modified in order to satisfy reactiveness: Every agent announces a
price vector, an object is assigned to the agent who announces the highest price,
and the price paid for the object is the one announced by the owner of the object.
This modified mechanism is another example of a mechanism which satisfies all
our axioms.
With respect to the Benassy paper (1986) it can be easily established that there
is a close connection between his and our axioms. Our VT axiom is similar to
Benassy’s Assumption 1. The role played by R in our paper is played in Benassy
by his Assumptions 2, 3, 5 and his “market by market” restriction (p. 97). In fact,
it is not difficult to show that Benassy‘s assumptions imply R.
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